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Abstract
An alternative way o f modelling Stackelberg warfare -  i.e. a 
strategic fight for market leadership -  is suggested which avoids 
the inconsistencies o f the prevalent disequilibrium interpretation. 
In a reputation game Stackelberg warfare occurs as an equilibrium 
choice for two scenarios. In the first scenario a firm challenges its 
rival by playing Stackelberg leader. The other firm plays warfare 
to discipline its opponent and to make it return to the Cournot 
equilibrium. In the second scenario both firms simultaneously 
play warfare in the initial phase of the game until one o f them 
concedes and accepts to be the follower.
‘ Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Meeting of the European Economic Asso­
ciation, September 1994 in Maastricht (Netherlands).
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In Marktform und Gleichgewicht Heinrich von Stackelberg (1934) intro­
duced the leader and follower concept to oligopoly theory. Since then, 
the asymmetric Stackelberg equilibrium constituted by a leader and a 
follower has found wide acceptance in economics, including areas other 
than oligopoly.
Stackelberg himself was rather skeptical whether this equilibrium 
would be reached and maintained in real markets. His conjecture was 
that in duopoly both firms would try to capture the more profitable 
position of the leader. Although in this situation (subsequently called 
Stackelberg1 warfare) profits are drastically deteriorated he thought that 
both firms fighting for leadership would be the “normal case” in duopoly. 
According to him, the leader and follower equilibrium would occur only 
as an “exceptional case” .
On the contrary, the ensuing literature, more and more influenced 
by rising game theory, found the Stackelberg equilibrium quite appealing 
and was reluctant to use the warfare concept. The latter remained re­
stricted to a few lines in the textbooks as the case in which both firms in 
duopoly take the action of a leader. No single publication in economic lit­
erature explicitly deals with Stackelberg warfare or deepens Stackelberg’s 
analysis with respect to this part. Recently Stackelberg warfare even van­
ished from the textbooks: the latest editions of microeconomic or indus­
trial economic textbooks have dropped this topic. Why is Stackelberg’s 
idea of warfare in oligopoly theoretically unattractive though fighting for 
market leadership is clearly an empirically important phenomenon2?
Following Fellner (1949) Stackelberg warfare is interpreted as a dis­
equilibrium in a strict game theoretic sense. Only by mistake can both 
firms in a market choose to become the Stackelberg leader. But this 
concept is theoretically inconsistent: in a warfare disequilibrium firms
'Stackelberg referred to Bowley’s (1924, p.38) conjectural variations approach as 
similar to his concept of warfare. The criticism in this paper made on Stackelberg 
warfare applies unrestrictedly to Bowley “solution” .




























































































hold wrong conjectures about their rival which are not corrected or re­
vised. However, equilibrium requires both strategies and conjectures to 
be consistent with each other (Friedman (1983)). It is due to this flaw 
that Stackelberg warfare has not received any attention in the literature.
In the present paper an alternative approach towards Stackelberg 
warfare is suggested. It is based on the theory of reputation as intro­
duced by Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
Dynamic games of asymmetric information with reputational effects have 
been successfully used to explain the strategic quest for dominance by 
firms, most prominently predatory pricing, price wars and limit pricing3. 
While in games of perfect information these phenomena are difficult to 
demonstrate, the information based reputation games offer a new poten­
tial of explanation.
In the manner of these models Stackelberg warfare as an equilib­
rium choice is proved in this paper -  first for a scenario with one-sided 
uncertainty, the “discipline” scenario. It is shown that a firm with pri­
vate information about its type can credibly and profitably challenge its 
opponent by deviating from the symmetric Cournot equilibrium and by 
playing Stackelberg leader. The provoked firm, faced with the Stack­
elberg leader action of its opponent, does not accept to be follower in 
the long run. It plays Stackelberg warfare in order to make the other 
firm withdraw from its Stackelberg leader position, to discipline it. An 
equilibrium is derived in which both firms engage in warfare knowingly 
that the opponent does the same. They sacrifice short run losses in order 
to gain in the long run. Both firms play Stackelberg warfare: the first 
firm to augment and maintain its reputation, the opponent to deprive its 
rival of it. Strikingly, after warfare has occurred firms are likely to end 
up in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium. However, warfare occurs as an 
equilibrium choice rather than a result of mistakes.
A similar result holds if both firms have private information about 
their types. Given two-sided uncertainty both firms play Stackelberg 
warfare in a war of attrition game. This is called the “concession” sce­





























































































nario. Both firms play Stackelberg warfare in the initial phase of the 
game until one of them concedes and accepts to be the follower. The 
game ends in a Stackelberg leader and follower equilibrium and again 
warfare occurs as an equilibrium choice.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section
2 discusses Stackelberg’s approach and the game theoretic critique made 
upon the disequilibrium interpretation of Stackelberg warfare. In Section
3 the reputation game with one-sided uncertainty is presented. Section
4 discusses the case of two-sided uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stackelberg Warfare as a Disequilibrium?
The original idea of Stackelberg duopoly is based on the assumption 
that the Stackelberg leader (correctly) conjectures that its rival is acting 
according to the Cournot behavioural assumption. The Stackelberg fol­
lower chooses its action taking the leader’s decision as given to, i.e., to 
be follower only implies adaptive behaviour and not any concrete action. 
Stackelberg analyses a scenario (1934, pp. 16-24) in which two firms have 
the choice to take one of the roles. In Figure 1 his approach is represented 








Figure 1: Stackelberg’s duopoly game.
There are four possible outcomes. If one firm chooses “Leader” (in­
dicated by the subscript L) and the other “Follower” (F) then a Stackel­




























































































firm 1 or firm 2 as the leader. If both firms choose “Follower” the Cournot 
(C) equilibrium results. The situation of Stackelberg warfare (W) arises 
if both firms choose to be the leader.
For equilibrium analysis the nature of oligopoly competition has to 
be specified. It is assumed that firms are symmetric and have downward 
sloping reaction functions. These result generally, but not always in 
models of quantity competition. A differentiated price setting model may 
yield downward sloping reaction functions, too. However, henceforth it 
will be referred to output as firms’ actions.
With downward sloping reaction functions the Stackelberg leader 
gets a higher profit than the follower. Also the Cournot outcome is pre­
ferred to being follower. The worst case for both firms is the warfare sit­
uation (Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986)). Hence, given downward sloping 
reaction functions two Nash equilibria result: the Stackelberg solutions. 
Neither the Cournot outcome, nor Stackelberg warfare can describe an 
equilibrium.4 Both can occur only by mistake, as a disequilibrium5.
However, the disequilibrium interpretation is criticized in the liter­
ature. Firstly, this explanation lacks a realistic interpretation. It is hard 
to imagine that firms -  say producers of a new generation of RAM mi­
crochips -  would install too large capacities as a result of being erroneous 
about their role in the market. Generally it can be assumed that firms 
know their position in the market very well. If they engage in a fight to 
become the Stackelberg leader, then they do so consciously.
Secondly, this explanation of warfare contains a theoretical incon­
sistency. Friedman (1983, p.116) criticizes this approach and concludes:
4The fact that the Cournot solution is not an equilibrium of this game must appear 
as an awkward result. One will not doubt the reasonableness and usefulness of the 
Cournot equilibrium as a consequence of this game.
5With upward sloping reaction functions (which result in general under price com­
petition) being follower is preferred to being leader. Further Stackelberg warfare is 
preferred to being leader. The worst outcome is the Cournot case (Gal-Or (1985),.» 
Dowrick (1986)) which is the equilibrium of the game in Figure 1. Thus, also with 





























































































each thinks that the other is a follower and accordingly 
behaves as a leader. This has been said to cause a Stackel- 
berg disequilibrium, but in fact it is just another untenable 
situation that cannot arise.”
The crucial point is that firms have wrong conjectures about their rivals. 
The choice of the role of a leader is inseparably connected to a particular 
action (the leadership output), no matter what the opponent does. In the 
case of two Stackelberg leaders firms start with the wrong conjecture that 
their opponent plays follower and they do not correct it. Yet, equilibrium 
requires both actions and conjectures to be consistent with each other. 
This is obviously true for the two Stackelberg equilibria and the Cournot 
equilibrium (by default), but not for the warfare situation.
Recent contributions to the literature6 no longer base the leader- 
follower model on behavioral assumptions (duopoly-roles), but on a se­
quence of moves. The Stackelberg leader produces its quantity first and 
the follower, moving second, has to take this quantity as given. Leader­
ship has its origins in a historical differentiation among the firms rather 
than in a decision to “become” Stackelberg leader. Such timing games 
(Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)) avoid the inconsistencies described, how­
ever, they cannot provide a rationale for Stackelberg warfare either.
3 The “Discipline” Scenario
3.1 The Model
The following model is based on the theory of reputation as introduced by 
Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Reputation 
effects rely on asymmetric information about the firms’ types. This cap­
tures the realistic fact that firms are unlikely to be absolutely certain of 
their opponents’ options, motivations or behaviour. The introduction of 
uncertain types might also refer to the possibility of irrational behaviour




























































































of firms. Earlier contributions to the literature show that given only a 
very small amount of uncertainty about players’ types can lead to drastic 
changes in equilibrium behaviour.
Following Kreps and Wilson (1982a) two types of firms, a “weak” 
one and a “strong” one, are assumed. Here the two types differ with 
respect to their preferences about Stackelberg warfare, expressed in the 
following ranking about the profits in the standard duopoly constella­
tions:
“weak” type : 7r£ > 7rc  >  7Tf >  0, ttf > \nw \, (1)
“strong” type : Sq, >  itw > Ttc > >  0, (2)
where the subscripts L ,C ,F ,W  indicate the profit of the Stackelberg 
leader, the Cournot equilibrium, the follower and Stackelberg warfare 
respectively.
The ranking of the “weak” type results if both firms have down­
ward sloping reaction functions (Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986)). The 
assumption \kw\ < Tf for negative values of ttw ensures positive values 
in the equilibrium derived below. This is, however, not restrictive for 
most oligopoly models.
The “strong” firm “enjoys” warfare. It might, for example, have 
employed a manager who has a different objective from the owner of 
the firm (Vickers (1985)). The manager might follow a policy that is 
not profit maximizing from the point of view of the owner, but rather 
maximizes sales -  or a combination of profits and sales -  according to 
an incentive contract. (It is thus somewhat sloppy to speak of the it 
as “profits” ; strictly speaking the utility of firm owner (or manager) is 
meant.) The objective of the firm is assumed to be such that it prefers 
the warfare quantity/profit outcome to the Cournot one and thus it is 
a dominant strategy for the “strong” firm to produce the Stackelberg 
leader output.
Call the two duopolists firm 1 and firm 2 and assume that firm 2 
has prior beliefs that firm 1 is “strong” :





























































































These beliefs axe common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that 
firm 2 is “weak” with probability 1 (Section 4 deals with the case of 
two-sided uncertainty).
The game the firms are playing is based on a pre-market announce­
ment subgame. This might appear somewhat stylized, however, firms 
announcing business targets like market shares or sales for a new prod­
uct or a future period of time is a common phenomenon in the real world. 
This subgame is based on the following steps.
• The starting point of the game is simply that symmetric firms play 
an equally symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
• In this model deviations from the symmetric Cournot equilibrium 
can be expected from the “strong” firm 1 as well as from the “weak” 
firm 1 trying to mimic the “strong” type’s behaviour. In both cases 
firm 1 will announce production of the output of a Stackelberg 
leader. Thus, the first move is by firm 1 deciding to announce 
either the Cournot or the Stackelberg leader quantity.
• Since firm 2 cannot do better than in a Cournot equilibrium it 
comes only into play if firm 1 announces the Stackelberg leader 
quantity. Firm 2 then has to decide whether to accept being fol­
lower (with the appropriate quantity) or to try to discipline firm 
1 and announce also the Stackelberg leader quantity. This would 
mean warfare with the goal of making firm 1 withdraw from the 
Stackelberg leader position.
• Given that firm 2 announced playing Stackelberg warfare, firm 1 
might in fact want to withdraw its announcement to play Stack­
elberg leader: both firms return to the symmetric Cournot equi­
librium (firm 2 agrees to this, because it cannot do better than in 
a Cournot equilibrium). However, firm 1 might also not want to 
withdraw from its announced Stackelberg leader quantity. Then 
warfare is actually played.
• Finally quantities are set according to the announcements (Cournot, 




























































































This announcement subgame needs justification with respect to two 
points. To begin with, the quantities announced (and so the quantities 
indicated in the extensive form in Figure 2) are the only subgame perfect 
quantities. Firstly, according to (2) the “strong” firm produces the Stack- 
elberg leader output under all circumstances. Thus, the “weak” firm 1 
has to do the same when trying to mimic this behaviour. Secondly, if 
firm 2 accepts being follower, then the follower quantity is the optimal 
response to firm l ’s Stackelberg leader output. The only undetermined 
action is the warfare output of firm. 2. Though it will occur as an equi­
librium action in this game it is not determined by subgame perfection. 
Firm 2 is assumed to produce the Stackelberg leader output to keep the 
game symmetric. However, any quantity which disciplines the “weak” 
firm 1 in the long run (i.e. which pushes its profits below ttc) works out 
in the equilibrium derived below. If the warfare actions were asymmetric 
in this sense it would only be necessary to introduce different 7r̂  and 
TTw for the “weak” firm 1 and firm 2.
The second point of justification concerns the credibility of the an­
nouncements. Clearly, the announcements themselves do not involve any 
commitment. For example, if warfare results from the announcements 
firm 2 could strictly increase its profit by deviating from its announce­
ment and by producing the Stackelberg follower quantity. However, such 
behaviour would not be rational. As will become clear in the equilib­
rium derived below firm 2 does not do so because it would not learn 
anything about firm 1: only actually committing to the warfare output 
can make firm 1 withdraw from its leadership output. Similarly, firm 1 
does not deviate from its announcements because it would lose its rep­
utation. Thus, in equilibrium firms cannot gain by not carrying out the 
announced quantities.
The structure of the game is summarized as in Figure 2. It is — 
apart from Nature’s move -  repeated a finite number of times. Periods 
are numbered backwards in time: n =  N, N — 1, . . . ,  1. The prior beliefs/) 
are updated in every period such that pn denotes the posterior in period 
n. The discount factor is denoted by <5, with 0 <  8 <  1. To make it 





























































































Figure 2: The extensive form of the warfare game.
periods it is assumed without loss of generality (see the Appendix for a 
generalization of this assumption) that
TTW +  T̂L6 >  7Tc(l +  6). (4)
Stackelberg warfare might occur due to the following effect. Firm 
1 could make use of the asymmetric information. Though being in 
fact “weak” it produces the Stackelberg leader output pretending to be 
“strong” . Even if firm 2 also plays Stackelberg warfare this might be a 
profitable strategy for firm 1: engaging in warfare might convince firm 2 
that firm 1 is actually “strong” , while settling the fight is definitely proof 
of being “weak” .
Firm 2 also has -  after a provocation by firm 1 -  an incentive to 
engage in warfare. If firm 2 continues playing follower it cannot discover 
whether firm 1 is “strong” or not. Only if firm 2 plays warfare it can force 
the troublemaker to settle the fight and so to reveal itself as being “weak” 




























































































makes it possible to reach the higher profit of the Cournot equilibrium 
for the remainder of the game. Hence, both firms intuitively might take 
warfare as an equilibrium action. This presumptive equilibrium is derived 
in detail in the next section.
3.2 Equilibrium for 1, 2 and N Periods
To solve for the equilibrium of the N-period game the equilibria of games 
of 1 and 2 periods axe analysed. This is equivalent to finding the solution 
for the last and the next to last periods of a N-period game. Then the 
equilibrium for N periods is stated. The equilibrium concept applied 
is that of sequential equilibrium as in Kreps and Wilson (1982b). A 
sequential equilibrium requires the specification of strategies and beliefs 
over the periods of the game.
To determine the equilibrium of a single play of this game (or the 
final stage of an N-period game) is straightforward. To begin with, the 
“strong” firm 1 plays Stackelberg leader at decision node D\ in Table 3 
because this is a dominant strategy. Also, if it is “weak” , firm 1 plays 
Stackelberg leader at P 2 if its type is not known with probability 1.
If firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader at D3 it gets ttw with probability 
Pi and 7Tc with probability (1 — P\). From playing follower a profit ftp 
results. Maximizing its expected profit firm 2 prefers to play Stackelberg 
leader if p\nw +  (1 — p\)itc >  ^f - Solving for p\ (and calling this value 
a i) one obtains
~Kc ~ ftF
P\ <  ---------------
Kc — Kw
=  « 1. (5)
Firm 2 plays follower if the inequality is reversed.
Given that pi < c*i and firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader the “strong” 
firm 1 chooses warfare because it strictly prefers the warfare to the 
Cournot outcome. For the “weak” firm 1 at decision node D5 it can­
not pay to engage in warfare because there are no further periods in 
which it could use its reputation.
Now imagine a game of two periods. Given that firm 2 plays Stack­




























































































warfare: according to condition (4) the cost of fighting, the warfare out­
come in period two, is lower or equal than the benefits, the leadership 
profit in period 1. This is a necessary condition. A sufficient condition 
has to include firm 2’s behaviour which depends on the beliefs p2.
Assume firstly that p2 > at\. Then playing warfare in period 2 is 
sufficient to make firm 2 follow in period 1 according to equation (5). 
Hence, the “weak” firm 1 plays Stackelberg warfare in period 2, and in 
period 1 a leader and follower equilibrium results.
Secondly, if p2 <  oq it cannot be an equilibrium for the “weak” firm
1 to play warfare with probability 1 or to settle with probability 1. In the 
former case the posterior probability would not be sufficient to make firm
2 follow in period 1 and in the latter case firm 1 ’s strategy would induce 
firm 2 to play Stackelberg warfare at Z)3 with probability 1. Hence, firm 
1 of the “weak” type plays a mixed strategy. The mutual dependence of 
strategies requires that in a mixed strategy equilibrium firm 1 randomizes 
such that firm 2 is indifferent between playing Stackelberg leader and 
follower in period 1. By the same token firm 2 plays mixed in period 1 
such that firm 1 is indifferent about its actions in period 2.
Let /?2 be the conditional probability that the “weak” firm 1 plays 
warfare in period 2. Bayes’ rule for updating beliefs after the occurrence 
of warfare (see equations (A.4) in the Appendix) in period 2 gives
Pi =P2/(P2  + & ( 1  - P i ) ) -  ( 6 )
In equilibrium /32 is such that inequality (5) holds with equality (i.e., firm 
2 is indifferent in period 1). Solving (6) for /32 gives
0 2  = (7)
Since warfare occurs in period 2 p\ =  aq and so
So far firm l ’s behaviour was studied under the assumption that 




























































































will firm 2 do so? From 2’s point of view, the total probability of firm 1 
choosing warfare in period 2 is
P2 +  ( l -P 2 ) f c  =  P2 ( — — — )  =  —  • (9)
If firm 2 chooses Stackelberg warfare at D3 it gets nw with probability 
p2/a\. After this event and in equilibrium firm 2’s posterior beliefs p\ 
are such that it has the expected profit of a follower ttf in period 1. With 
probability 1 — (p2/ a i) firm 2 receives 7Tc in period 2. Then firm 1 is 
known to be “weak” and firm 2 gets the Cournot payoff also in period 1. 
For this expected profit to be larger than the opportunity (the follower 
payoff in both periods) (p2/ai){nw  +  ^f 8) +  (1 — P2/°‘i)n c (l  + 5 )  > 
7i>(l +  8) has to hold. Solving for p2 (which becomes a2) gives
P2 <
________(ttc -  ttf )2(1 +  6)________
(7Tc -  Trw)(nc (l +  6) -  7xf 8 -  7r̂ ) =  « 2-
( 10)
Finally, firm 2’s mixed strategy (denoted by 7) in period 1 has to be 
derived. If p2 < a2 <  «1 firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader and the “weak” 
firm 1 randomizes with /32 in period 2. With probability /?2 warfare arises 
and firm 2’s posterior beliefs in period 1 are a x. In equilibrium, firm 2 
plays a mixed strategy in period 1 such that firm 1 is indifferent (in 
terms of expected profits) in period 2: f32(nw +  77Tc8 +  (1 — 7 )kl8) +  
(1 — /32)ttc(1 +  6) =  7Tc(l +  8). Rearranging terms gives
T = --------- ---------------------------- ' <n)
Condition (4) ensures that 0 < 7 <  1.
Now strategies and beliefs for an N-period version of the game are 




























































































P roposition  1. The following strategies and beliefs constitute a sequen­
tial equilibrium.
Beliefs of firm 2.
• If firm 1 plays Stackelberg leader and firm 2 plays follower in period 
n then pn_i =  pn.
• If firm 1 plays Cournot or settles a warfare situation in period n 
then pn- 1 =  0.
• If warfare occurs in period n then pn-\ =  max (an _ j , ) .
Behaviour of firm 1.
• A “strong” firm 1 plays Stackelberg leader at decision node D\ and 
warfare at D4.
• A “weak” firm 1 at Z?2 plays Stackelberg leader if it has not played 
Cournot or settled before. Otherwise it plays Cournot.
• Given n >  1 and pn >  an_i it pays a “weak” firm 1 to play warfare 
at £>5 with probability 1. If pn < an-\ firm 1 mixes: with probabil­
ity (3n warfare occurs, with (1 — /3n) it settles the conflict. If n =  1 
firm 1 of the “weak” type does not play warfare.
Behaviour of firm 2.
• If pn < an Firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader.
• If pn =  an firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader with probability 7 . Given 
that prior beliefs p =  an firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader with prob­
ability 1.




























































































The probabilities an, (3n and 7 are given by
(12)
(13)
K\V +  7 1 ~ 7Tc( 1 +  6) 
(TIT -  7TC )<5
(14)
P roof. See the Appendix.
This equilibrium can be proven to be unique on the equilibrium 
path (with one exception) by using the concept of admissible equilibria 
as part of Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) strategic stability (see Govindan 
(1992)). The exception is the definition of the equilibrium path if prior 
beliefs p =  an. Any mixed strategy of firm 2 will work for this case.
3.3 Properties of Equilibrium Behaviour
What sequence of decisions by the firms over the time horizon does the 
equilibrium behaviour as specified imply? In this section the answer to 
this problem is given in a second proposition. Afterwards the result is 
illustrated with a numerical example.
Proposition  2. Let j(p ) denote the first period in which firm 2 plays 
Stackelberg leader (and hence in which warfare might occur), that is 
j(p ) — max (j\p < af). Then
• for any prior beliefs p the game begins with a sequence of periods 
from N to j(p ) in which firm 1 can exercise Stackelberg leadership 
provided the game is sufficiently long.






























































































• If firm 1 is “weak” the game ends in the remaining periods j(p ) — 
l to 1 in a Cournot equilibrium with a probability of 1 — (1 — 
7) Pi- In the limit
j(p) - i
lim Prob.(Cournot) =  lim 1 — (1 — 7) TT /3; =  1. 
p—-o v p- o M
• If firm 1 is “strong” the game has firm 1 as a Stackelberg leader 
over all periods.
P roof. See the Appendix.
Part two and three of the proposition are stated for the limit p —► 0. 
Note that -  in contrast to signalling games -  there is no discontinuity of 
equilibrium behaviour if p =  0. Assume that p =  0 and firm 1 plays out 
of equilibrium Stackelberg leader. Then warfare occurs with probability 
1 in the initial period N and the game evolves according to the mixed 
strategy behaviour specified in Proposition 1. Similarly, if p >  0 but 
j  < N warfare occurs with probability (3j and then the game evolves as 
in Proposition 1.
Firms’ expected profits per period in periods n > j{p ) are E (tti) =  
7Tjr for the “weak” firm 1 and E (k2) =  71:F for firm 2. Average expected 
payoffs per period for the last j(p ) periods are E (tti) =  7Tc, E(n2) =  ftp. 
This follows from Propositions 1 and 2. Note that firm 2 has a positive 
expected profit at all stages of the game. For this reason it does not 
choose to exit the market even if it makes zero or negative profits in the 
period(s) of warfare. The expected profits indicate that the “weak” firm 
1 gains from its type being private information while firm 2 looses profits.
In what follows the result is illustrated with a numerical example 
for a “weak” firm 1. In this example (see Table 1) the profits are 717, =  
5 ,7rc =  2, ttf =  1, 7Tw =  0 and 6 =  0.95. Prior beliefs are assumed to be 
p =  0.031.
For these values j  =  20, i.e., in period 20 firm 2 is willing to choose 




























































































would not play Stackelberg warfare with probability 1. But since firm 2 
does not yet fight in 21 the leader/follower pattern results in this period 
with probability 1.) In period 20 firm 1 plays the aggressive strategy 
with a probability of 0.939, so warfare is likely to occur. If the Cournot 
equilibrium results in this period (which is the case with a likelihood of 
0.061) posterior beliefs p19 =  0 and firms play Cournot for the rest of the 
game.
Period pn Firm 2 play 
St.-leader if:




N P n P n  < <*n P n  > a N -1 L/F
N-l 0.031 0.031 < &N-1 0.031 > &N—2 L/F
22 0.031 0.031 < 0.028 0.031 > 0.030 L/F
21 0.031 0.031 < 0.030 0.031 > 0.032 L/F
else with /32 1 =  0.968
20 0.031 0.031 < 0.032 0.031 > 0.34 W (0.939)
else with f}20 =  0.939 C (0.061)
-  if warfare occurred in 20 -
19 0.034 0.034 < 0.034 0.034 > 0.037 W  (0.273)
else with else with (32 — 0.916 L/F  (0.702)
7 =  0.298 C (0.025)
-  if L/F occurred in 4 -
3 0.192 0.192 < 0.245 0.192 > 0.33 W (0.482)
else with fiz =  0.482 C (0.518)
-  if Cournot occurred in 3 -
2 0 0 < 0.33 0 > 0.5
else with fi2 =  0 C
1 0 0 < 0.5 Do not play warfare c
Table 1: A numerical example of the warfare game. Numerical values 




























































































Given that warfare occurred in 20 posterior beliefs p19 — 0.034. 
Now also firm 2 plays a mixed strategy: with a probability of 7 =  0.298 
it plays Stackelberg leader and with 1 — 7 =  0.702 follower. Firm 1 mixes 
with /?i9 =  0.916 -  given that firm 2 played Stackelberg leader. Hence, 
in period 19 warfare results with a probability of 0.273, a leader/follower 
market structure with a probability of 0.702 and a Cournot equilibrium 
with a probability of 0.025.
In the same manner the game proceeds over the remaining periods: 
after an instance of warfare beliefs held by firm 2 are updated and firm 2 
mixes with 7 , after an instance of leadership beliefs are carried forward 
and firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader with a probability of 1. Firm 1 mixes 
in each period with /?„ -  if no Cournot equilibrium has resulted from such 
mixed behaviour.
For a Cournot equilibrium to occur there is a positive probability in 
each period. Moreover, this probability is increasing as the game moves 
on towards its final periods. As proved in Proposition 2 the likelihood 
that the game ends in a Cournot equilibrium approaches 1 in the limit as 
p —> 0. In the numerical example Cournot occurs arbitrarily in period 3 
for the first time and then for the rest of the game. The total probability 
that the example game does end in a Cournot equilibrium is 0.977.
4 The “Concession” Scenario
In this section the analysis is extended to the case that both firms have 
private information about their type, i.e., both firm are possibly “strong” . 
Assuming the same preferences as stated in (1) and (2) a “strong” type 
will take the action of a Stackelberg leader under any circumstances. 
Therefore any failure to set the Stackelberg leader output reveals a firm 
as “weak” . Hence, a challenge by just one firm (as above for the one-sided 
case) is no longer appropriate. Both “weak” firms will play Stackelberg 
leader in the beginning of the game in order to augment their reputation 
for being “strong” .




























































































have two actions to choose between: continue to play Stackelberg leader 
or to concede. If both firms play Stackelberg leader then warfare arises. 
The firm which concedes first accepts the position of a follower and the 
other firm can exercise Stackelberg leadership for the remainder of the 
game.
This is clearly a game of “chicken” (or a “war of attrition” ). This 
particular type of chicken game lacks a fixed premium at the end (unlike 
many chicken games in the literature), but one which is decreasing in 
time towards the end. The preferences for ttw are private information 
and beliefs about these are updated every period. Hence, this game 
is a non stationary wax of attrition with asymmetric information. The 
chicken game is extensively treated in the literature (see e.g. Hendricks et 
al. (1988)). A two type game with asymmetric information is analysed 
by Kreps and Wilson (1982, Section 4) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1987). 
Their solution is applied here.
Modelling this setup in discrete time (like the model above) leads 
to recursions. Therefore the game is assumed to be in continuous time. 
Time goes backwards over an interval which is normalized to the length 
of one: t £ [1, 0].
Suppose, for example, that firm 1 concedes first, at time t. That is, 
firms play warfare for (1 — t) and firm 2 is Stackelberg leader for a time 
of length t. Then profits are
7T! — (1 — t)TTw +  tltp (15)
7T2 =  (1 -  t)nW +  t-KL. (16)
From this it follows that for “weak” firms it is best to have the opponent 
concede (since nl > Tip) and second best to concede oneself. To stick to 
warfare is costly for a “weak” firm because the opportunity (the follower 
profit) is available at any time and Tip > nw .
While p still stands for the prior on firm l ’s type, let q denote the 
prior probability that firm 2 is “strong”




























































































These prior beliefs are common knowledge. Both firms update their 
posterior assessments concerning the toughness of the opponent at time 
t: the history of the game is summarized in the posteriors pt and qt.
In equilibrium firms play with “stopping rules” , a date at which 
to concede with a certain probability if the opponent has not given in 
yet. Call these probabilities for an engagement in warfare pt(hPt,Qt) 
and j t(t,Pt,qt) for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Each player’s stopping 
rule has to be optimal given the probability distribution over the other 
player’s type.
Now consider firms’ decision to stick to warfare over the period 
(f, t — h), h being small. In equilibrium a firm must be indifferent (up 
to terms of o(h)) between conceding immediately at t and waiting until 
(t — h) and then conceding:
Based on this calculation the following equilibrium can be derived.
P roposition  3. In a game of two “weak” firms with prior beliefs of p 
and q respectively for being “strong”
ability 1 and the other firm according to /3i(l,p,q) or 7i ( l ,p,q) 
respectively. If p — q both firms play warfare with their mixed 
strategy.
• Given that neither firm has conceded at time t <  1, firms continue 
playing warfare in t with a probability of (3t(t,pt,qt) and Jt(t,pt, q,) 
where
hTTW +  (1 -  qt)/3t(t,Pt,qt)hirLt =  hirF, 
hnw +  (1 -  Pt)lt{i,Pt',qt)h'KLi =  hnF.
(18)
(19)




























































































• Posterior beliefs if neither firm has conceded are given by
<1<P,
Q>P-
P roof. See the Appendix.
At time 1 the game starts with priors p and q. If p > q firm 1 plays 
Stackelberg leader with probability 1. Firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader 
with probability 71 (p, q) and concedes with 1 — 71 (p,q). If the mixed 
strategy calls for firm 2 to concede a Stackelberg equilibrium with firm 
1 as a leader remains until time 0. If firm 2 fights equilibrium requires 
that posterior probabilities move according to pt =  qt. Similarly, if the 
game starts with priors q > p firm 2 plays warfare with probability 1 and 
firm 1 mixes with fi\(p,q).
In either case, given that warfare results in t =  1 both firms play 
mixed strategies and pt =  qt follows for the posterior beliefs. Again at 
any time t if one firm concedes, the Stackelberg equilibrium results, if 
warfare results posteriors are updated increasingly. Clearly, only if both 
firms are “strong” they reach pt =  qt — 1 at some t >  0. “Weak;” firms on 
the other hand will concede before t =  0 (see Kreps and Wilson (1982a)).
In contrast to the model in Section 3 firms do not end up in a 
Cournot but in Stackelberg constellation. Simultaneous concession (and 
only that would imply a Cournot equilibrium) is a probability zero event. 
There is neither a profitable possibility (in terms of expected profits) for 
the firm which conceded first to play warfare again in order to make 































































































Stackelberg’s (1934) original interpretation of warfare in duopoly is that 
of a strategic fight for leadership in which firms engage consciously. On 
the contrast, the interpretation of Stackelberg warfare as a disequilib­
rium, a result of mistakes, ignores the element of strategic fighting com­
pletely. Both approaches, Stackelberg’s original one as well as the disequi­
librium interpretation, fail to provide a rationale for warfare in duopoly 
because of the static nature of the frameworks. In this paper a rationale 
for an engagement in Stackelberg warfare was proved. Warfare arises if 
either one or both firms in duopoly, based on reputation effects, strate­
gically strive for leadership.
A striking result of the paper is that for the “discipline” scenario 
firms are likely to end up in a Cournot equilibrium, i.e., in a symmetric 
situation in which reputation effects are no longer at work. This paradox­
ical phenomenon of a fight for dominance with an eventually symmetric 
outcome in the end is known from the literature. Mailath (1989) shows 
in a game with simultaneous signalling that price wars may occur as an 
equilibrium. Similarly to the result in this paper, these price wars do 
not affect ultimate market shares. In contrast to this, in the case of 
two sided uncertainty one firm can manage to maintain the position of a 
Stackelberg leader based on reputation effects.
Stackelberg warfare is obviously similar to predation. The structure 
of conflict is similar in both cases. However, in the case of warfare both 
firms deliberately accept losses for strategic reasons while in the case 
of predation the preying firm’s action makes the market unprofitable 
for the other firm. Consequently, predation is prohibited by competi­
tion law while warfare is not. Here the analysis of Stackelberg warfare 
has an implication for competition policy. Two recent empirical papers 
deal with Stackelberg warfare and predatory pricing. Phlips and Moras 
(1993) discuss the AKZO decision of the Commission of the European 
Community. While the Commission imposed a fine on AKZO for preda­
tory “abuse of a dominant position” Phlips and Moras find evidence of 




























































































and Newton (1993) investigate alleged cases of predation in the UK bus 
industry. Similar to Phlips and Moras their findings are in some cases 
that firms deliberately chose actions which denied profitable outcomes. 
They conclude that Stackelberg warfare and not predatory behaviour 
happened. Generally, when trying to identify cases of predation it has 
to be checked carefully whether firms did not consciously take decisions 
which deny profitable outcomes in the market (i.e. Stackelberg warfare), 






























































































Generalization of Profit Relations
Condition (4) imposed on the relation of the profits seems to restrict the 
generality of the model. In particular, the condition is not fulfilled for 
the widely used linear demand curve. Generalizing (4), let k denote the 
number of periods that is required for a profitable engagement in warfare 
by a “weak” firm 1:
k k
k =  min(7iv  +  7t£ ^ 6’ > 7rc ^ ^ ) .  (A .l)
i—l i=0
In (4) it is assumed that k =  1 to keep to model clearly arranged. It is, 
nevertheless, easy to describe what happens if this unhappy restriction 
is relaxed 7.
To begin with, what remains unchanged for k >  1 is the beginning 
of the game. For small prior beliefs p there is a time horizon N  such that 
firm 1 can be Stackelberg leader over a number of times until - according 
to the notation of Proposition 2 - period j .
Different are the final periods of the game. The “weak” firm 1 
will not play warfare in the last k — 1 periods and this is known by 
firm 2. Hence the total probability that firm 1 plays warfare equals the 
probability pn that firm 1 is “strong” for n < k.
Now think of a period n (where [j > n > k—1) in which firm 2 plays 
Stackelberg leader. The “weak” firm 1 needs k — 1 subsequent periods of 
Stackelberg leadership to make warfare in j  a profitable strategy. Thus, 
it is not sufficient that the mixed strategy f}„ makes firm 2 indifferent in
7Take the example of a linear demand duopoly with constant marginal cost. The 
inverse demand curve is given by p =  a — b(xj +  X2 ). In equilibrium and for <5 =  1 
profits of 7tl =  (a — c)2/8b, ire =  (a — c)2/9b,irp =  (a — c)2/18b and irw — 0 result. 
Plugging these profits in (A .l) k =  9 follows. This means that a firm, after an instance 
of warfare, needs 8 subsequent periods of Stackelberg leadership to break even with 




























































































period n — 1 only. Equilibrium requires this to happen over k — 1 periods 
until n — (k — 1). In turn firm 2’s mixed strategy 7 in equilibrium has to 
make firm 1 indifferent over this part of the game.
That is, equilibrium strategies in (ra —2, —1)) also depend
on what happened in n. More abstractly speaking in games of k >
1 the beliefs pn are no longer a sufficient statistic for the equilibrium 
strategies. The latter will depend on pn and the history of the game 
over the last k periods. Rewriting the model such that the history from 
n ,. . .  ,n — (k — 1) is included would not change Propositions 1 and 2 
structurally. The results derived hold for any constellations of profit 
functions with downward sloping reaction functions.
Proof of Proposition 1
Bayesian consistency of beliefs. If firm 1 plays Stackelberg leader and 
firm 2 plays follower nothing is learned about firm 1. So the beliefs of 
period n are carried forward to stage n — 1,
Pn-\=Pn■ (A.2)
If firm 1 plays Cournot at decision node D 1 or settles a warfare situation 
it is known to be “weak” . Since a “strong” firm would not follow such 
behaviour firm 2 updates
Pn- 1 =  0. (A.3)
If firm 1 plays warfare Bayes’ rule gives
pn_ 1 =  Prob.(“strong” \warfare)
Pr ob. (war fa r  e|“ strong" ) Prob.(u strong” )
P.(war.\“ strong” ) P .(llstrong” ) +  P.(war.\“weak” ) P .(“weak” )
—  * ' P"______________________  (A 4")
1 Pn +  /?n(l ~ Pn)
Substituting Pn as in equation (13) gives




























































































Hence, firm 2’s beliefs are consistent with firm l ’s strategies and Bayes’ 
rule.
Behaviour of firm 2. In period n the total probability -  from firm 
2’s point of view -  that firm 1 engages in warfare is
Pn +  Pn(l -  Pn) =  Pn/<Xn-1- (A.6)
Thus, if firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader in n warfare occurs with pn/an- 1 
and a Cournot equilibrium results with 1 — pn/an_\. In the former case 
firm 2’s posterior beliefs are a„_i and the profit of a follower is expected 
for the remainder of the game. Hence, firm 2’s expected profit from 
playing Stackelberg leader in n is
£ « )  =  (pn/otn-i)(n W +  *> 53 £*) +  (1 -  pn/an-i)(nc  53 <$’) (A-7)
t—i ;=o
E(n2) has to be larger than playing the alternative (the follower option) 
for the rest of the game:
(A.8)
i=0
Rearranging terms and plugging in (5n yields
n - u (  \
” ,Ti \ ( n c - n F) EJ=0 & + ttf - ttw )
If the inequality is reversed firm 2 is better off playing follower. Equilib­
rium behaviour requires firm 2 to play a mixed strategy 7 if pn =  a n. In 
this case equation (A.8) becomes an equality and firm 2 is indifferent be­
tween playing Stackelberg leader and follower. Hence, any mixed strategy 
is optimal and thus 7 is. In the same way playing Stackelberg leader with 
probability 1 is optimal given the case that prior beliefs (i.e., without an 
instance of warfare) p =  an.
Behaviour of firm 1. A “strong” firm 1 is better off playing warfare 





























































































For a “weak” firm 1 to play warfare in period n obviously requires 
(4) and so n > 1 as necessary conditions. Given that
Pn > an-i  (A.10)
firm 2 does neither play Stackelberg leader in period n nor n — 1. Hence 
the Stackelberg leader payoff is feasible for firm 1 in n which is strictly 
preferred to the Cournot outcome. Thus, firm 1 plays warfare. In equi­
librium the “weak” firm 1 randomizes if
Pn ^  ^n—1* (A-11)
Firm 1 mixes with /3n such that firm 2 is indifferent between playing 
leader or follower in n — 1 and firm 2 randomizes in a mixed strategy 
equilibrium with 7 in n — 1 such that firm 1 is indifferent in period n. It 
was already shown above that playing the mixed strategy (3n makes firm 
2 indifferent in n — 1. It remains to determine 7 . The “weak” firm l ’s 
expected profit from randomizing with f3n is
£ « )  -  /3„[nw + 7 S W - 1) + (1 -  7)(*LS + £(7rr2)] + (1 -  Pn)*c £  F.
i=0
(A.12)
In equilibrium this expected profit has to equal the one from playing the 
opportunity (that is Cournot)
£ K )  =  * c "x ;V -
i=0
Plugging this into (A.12) and solving for 7 gives
TXw +  -  7TC(1 +  6)7
(717 -  7TC)(5
Hence, the proposition follows.□
(A.13)
(A.14)
Proof of Proposition 2





























































































Then, for a positive 6 and for lim „_oc l/an =  oo and so one gets lim^oo 
an =  0. For 6 =  1 divide denominator as well as the numerator of an by 
(ttc — Kw)- Then l / a n becomes
Now limn-.oo X)"=i 7 =  oo implies lim^oo ln(l / a n) =  oo and so lim,,^^ 
an =  0 also for 6 =  1. Hence, for any positive p one can find a time 
horizon N  such that a N < p.
In period j{p ) firm 2 plays Stackelberg leader with probability 1. 
(The total probability that Stackelberg warfare occurs at least once is 
equal to the probability that it occurs precisely in j  since further occur­
rences of warfare in the game tree are only possible if warfare happens 
in j .)  Firm 1 of the “weak” type mixes with
berg leader one period earlier or later). Modifying (A.20) gives
(A.16)
where c =  (np — tt\v )/(kc — ^f )- Taking logarithms gives
n
ln (l/a „ )  =  ]T(ln(i +  c) -  ln(i)). (A.17)
•=i
By the mean value theorem
ln(z +  c) — ln(i) 1 (A-18)—  j  t  ^  »  j ;  t  I
c i'
and since i <  i +  c <  2i at some finite i it follows that
(A-19)
(A.20)
by definition of j{p). Also
A?(p)+i ^  P — ai(p) (A.21)





























































































Clearly, p —> 0 implies j(p ) —* oo, then otj(P) —> 0 and so otj(p)~ 1, aj(p)+ i —*
0. The first term on the right hand side in (A.22) is clearly positive and 
—t 1. The second term on the right hand side is also positive. Since 
numerator and denominator —> 0 with the same speed of convergence,
limPro&.(TTar/are in j(p )) — 1 (A.23)
p—*o
follows.
In the remaining periods (j  — 1, . . . ,  1) the probability that the 
Cournot equilibrium does not occur in a particular period n is f3n. The 
probability that a Cournot equilibrium does not result in the last period 
(given that Cournot has not been played up to then) is 1 — 7. Thus, 
the probability that the game moves into a Cournot equilibrium in some 
period between j  — 1 and 1 is
j - 1
Prob.(Cournot) =  1 — (1 — 7) JJ
i=i
Since
1 -  a - 7) n a > i - ( i -  7)(&-i)i_i
*=i
and for (3j-\ <  1
Jim 1 -  (1 -  7 )(Pi-\)3~l =  1
j —*oo
the third part of Proposition 2
lim P rob. (Cournot) =  1
p—0
follows. This completes the proof. □
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is adopted (with modifications necessary for this model) from 
Kreps and Wilson (1982a, Section 4).

































































































Over the interval (t,t — h) the conditional probability a firm is 
“strong” , given that it has not conceded yet is according to Bayes’ rule
Pt-h =  Pt/(Pt +  (1 -  Pt)lth) =  pt/ 1 -  (1 -  Pthth), (A.28)
qt-h =  qt/(qt +  (l -  qt)Pth) =  qt/ 1 -  ( l  -  qt)ith). (A.29)
Rearranging terms gives
Pt ~ Pt-h ,, \ ttf - n w dp
q t-q t-h  TTf-TTw . dq
= „ ( ! - , , ) A = « — —  =  * =  5 ^ 5  <A-31)
It follows that dpt/dqt =  Pt/qt- Integrating dpt/pt =  dqt/qt yields p =  q 
in equilibrium. From this the initial equilibrium behaviour at t =  1 is 
obtained.
Now integrating pt/pt =  {'ftp — nw)/^Li (and similarly for qt/qt) 
one obtains
* F ~ * W
pt =  t tl k (A.32)
* F ~ TW
qt =  t k\ (A.33)
The constants of integration k and k1 have to be chosen such that p\ =  
9i — Pi P > q and pi =  qi =  q; q > p. This is obtained by k =  k’ =  p; p > 
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